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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
ALAN G. ROSS, a single man; LARRY R. BROWN, 
a married man as to his sole and separate 
property; MICHAEL R. MURPHY and NANCY B. 
MURPHY, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
v. 




The ESTATES OF F.M. HARKER and GLADYS L. 
HARKER; BANK OF THE CASCADES, dba FARMERS & 
MERCHANTS BANK, an Oregon corporation doing 
business in the State of Idaho; BANNER 
BANK, a Washington corporation doing 
business in the State of Idaho; and any and 
all other claimants in and to that common 
beach area being approximately 20 feet wide 
and 132.87 feet long and consisting of all 
that property lying between the shore of 
Priest Lake and the West boundary of Lot 1 
Steamboat Bay Lots according to the Plat 
thereof as recorded on February 21, 1966, 
in the records of Bonner County, Idaho, 
Book 2 of Plats, Page 125, located in 
Government Lot 5 Section 27, Township 60 




























* * * * * 
DOCKET NO. 39152-2011 
Bonner County Case No. 2009-
904 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner 
* * * * 
THE HONORABLE STEVE VERBY, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING 
* * * * 
GARY A. FINNEY 
Finney Finney & Finney, P.A. 
120 E. Lake Street, Ste 317 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
(Attorney for Dorsey -
Defendant - Appellant) 
Edward J. Anson 
Attorney at Law 
608 Northwest Blvd., Suite 300 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
(Attorney for Banner Bank) 
Brent C. Featherston 
Featherston Law Firm, CHTD. 
Attorneys & Counselors at Law 
113 S. Second Ave. 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
(Attorney for 
Plaintiffs/Respondents) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(i) Nature of Case. 
Plaintiffs brought this action seeking quiet title to 
the disputed strip of land as being co-owners of the 
disputed property. Defendant Harker, deceased, is the last 
record vested title owner. Defendant DORSEY is owner of the 
platted Lot 1. Plaintiffs claim there is a strip of land 
lying between Lot 1 and Priest Lake. DORSEY claims there is 
no such strip of land, as it is platted as a portion of Lot 
1. Plaintiffs must rely on the strength of their own title 
and that they have no right, title, claim, or interest in 
the disputed property. 
(ii) Course of Proceedings Below and The Trial. 
A. The Action - Complaint 
Ross, Brown, and Murphy filed a Complaint for Quiet 
Title against the ESTATE of Harker, and DORSEY, for judgment 
for quiet title to the disputed property as an alleged 
common beach area, 20 feet in width and 132.87 feet in 
length lying between the water of Priest Lake and the West 
boundary of Lot 1 Steamboat Bay Lots according to the Plat 
thereof. Plaintiff alleged vested Title remained in Harker. 
(R. Vol. 1, p. 14, para X) 
B. Answer/Counterclaim 
DORSEY filed an Answer, Counterclaim, and Cross-Claim 
which alleged that Plaintiffs received no conveyance for the 
real estate at issue, and acquired no title from anyone. 
The Plat of Steamboat Bay by Harker had no dedication or any 
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wording creating a common beach. Harker stated specifically 
in the Owner's Certification that the platted Lot 1 
sidelines extended to Priest Lake - so the property at issue 
was platted as part of Lot 1. A reservation in the Deed 
from Harker to DORSEY'S predecessor in interest, Wright, 
reserving an interest in Harker, but never conveyed out by 
Harker, could not create ownership interest in Plaintiffs. 
DORSEY owns Lot I, which includes the disputed property, 
according to the Plat thereof. 
C. Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment 
Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, with no 
specificity or particularity stated. Their Memorandum in 
Support, in the Conclusion section, requested the Court to 
find and conclude that they, together with DORSEY, were co-
tenants and co-owners of real property lying between the 
mean high water mark of Priest Lake and the west boundary of 
Lot 1, Steamboat Bay Plat, based on common law dedication. 
They also claim that the language of a reservation in the 
Harker to Wright deed (1966) for Lot 1 created such a common 
ownership. DORSEY obtained a Warranty Deed for Lot 1 and 2 
from Wright in 1999. 
DORSEY filed an Objection, moving the Court to deny 
summary judgment, with supporting affidavits (by Nitella 
Wright and A.B. Shobe), and a Memorandum in Opposition. The 
motion was argued (3/17/2010) to District Judge Charles 
Hosack who said at the hearing that he denied summary 
judgment, but directed a partial summary judgment that there 
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is not a fee simple title ownership of Dorsey to the 
disputed property. An Order, by District Judge Hosack was 
filed April 28, 2010 that the Court finds Dorsey holds no 
fee simple interest in the beachfront property, as title was 
reserved in the initial conveyance (1966) of Lot 1 from 
Harker to Wright. Dorsey filed May 12, 2010 a detailed and 
particular Motion To Set Aside, Alter, Amend, and Reconsider 
Court's Order filed April 28, 2010. This was not taken up 
until and as part of the trial - to District Judge Steve 
Verby, held June 27, and 28, 2011. 
D. Amended Complaint/Amended Answer and Counterclaim 
Plaintiffs subsequently filed an Amended Complaint For 
Quiet Title (9-15-2010) (R., Vol. 2, p. 190). The Amended 
Complaint has the same Exhibits A, B, and C as the 
Complaint. Dorsey filed an Amended Answer and Counterclaim 
By Dorsey (12-15-2010) (R., Vol. 2, p. 223). The Amended 
Complaint alleged the language of the Plat itself created a 
cloud on title to ownership of a Common Beach, but did not 
re-allege that the Plat created/dedicated a Common Beach. 
Their claim of an ownership interest was based solely on the 
attempted reservation in a Warranty Deed, signed 21 Feb 
1966, Harker to Wright, recorded 12 years later on May 18, 
1978, Instrument No. 200169, (Exhibit "A" - R., Vol. 2, p. 
202) which stated: 
"It is specifically understood that the grantors 
reserve, as a common beach for all owners in said 
plat, that certain tract and beach lying between 
the mean high water line and the West boundary 
line of said Lot One. Said reserved beach being a 
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tract approximately 20 feet wide between the 
waters of Priest Lake and the West boundary of the 
above described Lot One, and 132.87 feet in 
length." 
They claim that, 
"The above quoted language by Harker resulted in 
the reservation and creation of a Common Beach ara 
(sic) for the benefit of all owners of the 
Steamboat Bay Lots." 
Amended Complaint For Quiet Title 
R. Vol. 2, p. 195, para IX. 
By the Amended Complaint, the claim for relief was 
based solely and only the words of reservation in the Harker 
to Wright, Warranty Deed. At no time did Ross, Brown, and 
Murphy plead, allege, or argue that the Owner's 
Certification by Harker on the Plat was "ambiguous", nor 
that it created an "easement", which were the District 
Court's ultimate finding. The Amended Complaint added 
Farmers & Merchants Bank and Banner Bank, the deed of trust 
lienholders on the DORSEY Lots 1 and 2. The Farmers & 
Merchant's Bank were defaulted. Banner Bank answered the 
Amended Complaint by Attorney Edward J. Anson, but did not 
appear for trial, nor did its Attorney Anson. 
District Judge Verby took the matter under advisement, 
and reconvened Court on June 30, 2011 to orally announce his 
decision. The District Judge's announcement included 
findings, conclusions, and his decision directing entry of 
judgment for Ross, Brown, and Murphy against Dorsey, 
reported at TR. p. 313 through 330. 
Judge Verby's ruling was that the Owner's Certification 
was ambiguous, which was neither pled nor argued. He 
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determined the "intent" of Harker by the Owner's 
Certification was to create an easement in favor of all of 8 
lots in the Plat. He denied any recovery on the actual 
claim for relief of the Amended Complaint that the 
reservation in the Harker to Wright, Warranty Deed, created 
a co-tenancy/co-ownership in the reserved real estate at 
issue. Judgment was entered July 26, 2011. (R., Vol. 2, p. 
272) 
This is the wording of the Owner's Certification on the 
Plat by Harker in 1966: 
Owner's Certification 
"It is the intent of the Owners that Lot 1 and the 
20 foot private road as shown on the herein plat 
shall include the lands lying between the side 
lines produced to the mean-high-water line of 
Priest Lake." 
"The use of the 20 foot Private Road as shown on 
the herein plat is hereby dedicated to the 
adjacent lot owners. Access to public road cannot 
be guaranteed." 
Dorsey filed a Notice of Appeal (8-19-2011), and 
pursuant to Order of the Idaho Supreme Court, filed an 
Amended Notice of Appeal (9-21-2011). 
Ross, Brown, and Murphy filed no Cross-Appeal. They 
are Respondents only. The Banks filed no Cross-Appeal. 
(iii) A Concise Statement of the Facts. 
Plaintiffs, who are Respondents on appeal, are referred 
to as ROSS, BROWN, and MURPHY. They filed a Complaint For 
Quiet Title against the Estates of F.M. Harker and Gladys L. 
Harker, deceased, referred to as HARKER, and alleged that 
HARKER was the vested title holder of the real estate at 
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issue. They did not serve Harker with process. The other 
defendant is DORSEY, who is the Appellant, referred to as 
DORSEY, who owns Lots 1 and 2 of the Plat. The Complaint 
alleged that HARKER filed a Plat of Steamboat Bay Lots, 
recorded February 21, 1966 in Bonner County, concerning a 
small parcel of their land (200 feet X approximately 900 ft) 
adjacent to Priest Lake, Idaho, platted into Lots 1 through 
8. A copy of the Plat is Exhibit "A" to the Complaint. (R., 
Vol. 1, p. 19) Lot 1 is adjacent to Priest Lake, with Lots 
2 through 8 lying easterly, with a plat dedicating use of 
the road on the south side of all the lots. 
The OWNER'S CERTIFICATION by HARKER on the Plat 
consisting of the metes and bounds legal description 
followed by 2 separate 1 sentence paragraphs, as follows: 
"It is the intent of the Owners that Lot 1 and the 
20 foot private road as shown on the herein plat 
shall include the lands lying between the side 
lines produced to the mean-high-water line of 
Priest Lake." 
"The use of the 20 foot Private Road as shown on 
the herein plat is hereby dedicated to the 
adjacent lot owners. Access to public road cannot 
be guaranteed." 
(Signed and acknowledged by Harker 
on 17 Feb 1966) 
The Plat contains "dashed" lines from both the north 
and the south side lines of Lot 1 extending to the mean high 
water line labeled Priest Lake. DORSEY claims the first 
sentence of the Owner's Certification, clearly and 
unequivocally states that the disputed land is platted as 
part of Lot 1. 
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HARKER, sold Lot 1, to Wright, on a contract for deed, 
and as grantors signed a Warranty Deed, dated 21 Feb 1966, 
placed in an escrow collection of the Old National Bank of 
Spokane, Washington, conveying Lot 1 to the grantees R.G. 
Wright and Nitella Wright, hereinafter WRIGHT. When WRIGHT 
paid off the escrow collection, the Warranty Deed was 
recorded on May 18, 1978, Instrument No. 200169, which is 12 
years after it was signed. This Warranty Deed is Exhibit 
"B" to the Complaint, (R., Vol. 1, p. 20) and it created the 
basis of the sole claim for relief of the Amended Complaint 
as it contained these words, 
"It is specifically understood that the grantors 
reserve, as a common beach for all owners in said 
plat, that certain tract and beach lying between 
the mean high water line and the West boundary 
line of said Lot One. Said reserved beach being a 
tract approximately 20 feet wide between the 
waters of Priest Lake and the West boundary of the 
above described Lot One, and 132.87 feet in 
length." 
ROSS, BROWN, and MURPHY acquired their individual lots 
from subsequent intervening owners of lots in the Plat; ROSS 
acquired Lots 5 and 6, BROWN acquired Lots 3 and 4, and 
MURPHY acquired Lots 7 and 8. Through intervening deed 
restrictions, LO'l;s 3 and 4 were joined as a single lot; Lots 
5 and 6 were joined as a single lot, and Lots 7 and 8 were 
joined as a single lot. The chain of title deeds are all 
trial exhibits, and are not disputed. 
Lot 2 was also sold and deeded by HARKER to WRIGHT. 
Nitella Wright, widowed, in 1999 ultimately sold and 
conveyed Lots 1 and 2 to DORSEY. That Warranty Deed is 
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attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "C". (R. Vol. I, p. 21) 
DORSEY'S Warranty Deed language conveys to them all of the 
following described real property, to-wit (emphasis added) : 
"Lots 1 and 2 in Steamboat Bay Lots, according the 
plat thereof, recorded in Book 2 of Plats, page 
125, records of Bonner County, Idaho." 
The Warranty Deed further stated that Grantor does 
covenant to Grantees that she is the owners in fee simple 
absolute of said premises, that is free from all 
encumbrances and limitations except as follows: 
"SUBJECT TO" 
Following the "Subject To:" were, matters listed and 
described as 1 through 10. The listed subject to number 5, 
stated, 
"5. Terms, provisions, covenants, conditions, 
definitions, options, obligations and 
restrictions contained in a document, Instrument 
No. 200169, recorded May 18, 1978." 
The Harker/Wright "reservation" was unknown to DORSEY 
when they purchased, nor did they know that the SUBJECT TO: 
number 5 document recorded Instrument No. 200169, recorded 
May 18, 1978 was referencing the Warranty Deed (1966), 
Harker to Wright. DORSEY bought Lots 1 and 2 from widow 
Wright represented as Lot 1 being waterfront property owned 
by Wright, without any property, reserved or excepted, by 
Wright or Harker. The Warranty Deed conveyance language was 
for "Lots 1 and 2 in Steamboat Bay Lots, according to the 
Plat thereof (emphasis added), recorded in If The words, 
according to the plat thereof refer to the fact that the 
-11-
Owner's Certificate on the Plat, (Exhibit "A" to Complaint, 
R. Vol. 1 p. 19) declared the intent of the owners (Harker) 
that Lot 1 did include (emphasis added) the land between the 
sidelines extended to Priest Lake. In other words, the Plat 
created Lot 1 as waterfront extending to and adjoining 
Priest Lake. 
It is the contention of DORSEY that Lot 1 is described 
and platted to the water line (shore) of Priest Lake, so 
upon recording the Plat (1966) there has never been any land 
lying "between" Lot 1 and Priest Lake. In effect, the 
reservation by Harker to a tract between Priest Lake and Lot 
1 was for non-existent land. However, if Harker reserved 
any land it remained in Harker, and created no right in 
Ross, Brown, and Murphy. Harker no longer owns any of the 
platted Lots, or any property. 
DORSEY filed an Answer, Counterclaim, and Cross-Claim 
(R., Vol. 1, p. 23-24) which points out that there was no 
"common beach" created or dedicated by the Plat because of 
the wording on the Owner's Certification that Lot 1 included 
the lands lying between its sidelines produced to the water 
of Priest Lake. (R., Vol. 1, p. 25) Additionally, DORSEY 
alleged that as a matter of law the "reservation" language 
in the conveyance of Lot 1, Harker to Wright, could only be 
a reservation kept by Harker in themselves, which they 
retained and never conveyed. This reservation created no 
rights in third parties, strangers to the conveyance like 
ROSS, BROWN, and MURPHY or their predecessors' in title. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. District Judge Charles Hosack, who was not the 
trial judge, errored in favor of the Respondents 
on their Summary Judgment Motion and entered an 
Order which is in error as a matter of law in that 
Defendant DORSEY was conveyed title by Warranty 
Deed from WRIGHTS to all of Lots 1 and 2 according 
to the Plat of Steamboat Bay. The Warranty Deed, 
Wright to Dorsey has conveyance language as 
stated, and the "Subject to" language of the 
Warranty Deed is only a limitation on WRIGHTS' 
warranty(s) of title. This is the Warranty deed, 
Defendants' Exhibit "A." 
II. The trial judge, District Judge Yerby, made oral 
findings of fact and conclusions of law in which 
he agreed with the summary judgment decision of 
District Judge Hosack, which is in error for the 
same reasons District Judge Hosack was in error. 
III. District Judge Verby erred and disregarded the 
principal of law that in quiet title the issue is 
that the Plaintiffs (Respondents) must prove the 
sufficiency and strength of their own title and 
cannot assert a weakness of the title of the 
Defendants (Appellants). 
IV. District Judge Verby erred in ruling that the Plat 
dedicated a common use easement for all lot 
owners. Even assuming he is correct in that 
regard, Harker "reserved" ownership of this area, 
so Ross, Brown, and Murphy could not acquire any 
right, title, or interest based on the Plat 
language. 
V. The District Court erred in finding that the "use" 
of common beach property was dedicated by the 
original platting party, HARKER, as common 
easement. The Plat itself describes HARKERS' 
express statement to the contrary, that Lot 1 
included the land from the north and south 
boundaries of Lot 1 extended to the Lake Bed of 
Priest Lake. In other words, Lot 1 expressly was 
platted to include what the District Judge found 
to be "common beach." There is no wording of 
common beach, common area, or dedication upon the 
Plat. 
VI. Assuming for legal analysis that the intention of 
Harker by the Plat did dedicate an easement to use 
a beach area (disputed strip), Harker in the 
Warranty Deed To Wright "reserved" the beach area 
(disputed strip) to themselves, so it is error for 
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the District Judge to rule that the Plaintiffs -
Respondents received any interest in the real 
estate at issue by the doctrine of dedication by 
the Plat. 
VII. There was no delivery and no acceptance of any 
supposed dedication of common beach. 
VIII.The District Judge found dedication based on a 
"totality of circumstances and facts," but did not 
find, conclude, or articulate what circumstances 
or facts existed to make such finding or 
conclusion. 
IX. Upon platting there was no land "lying between the 
mean high water line of Priest Lake and the west 
boundary of Lot 1 owned by DORSEY. The west 
boundary of Lot 1 is platted to be at the same 
location on the ground as is the original 1890 
ordinary high water line of Priest Lake. District 
Judge Verby erred in finding what he described 
this beach area as buffer strip being a parcel of 
land not lying within platted Lot 1. 
X. Respondents are judicially estopped by their own 
Amended Complaint in which they alleged the area 
in dispute remained owned/vested in the original 
platting party, HARKERS. Respondents could not be 
co-owners or co-tenants of the same parcel. 
XI. Respondents' Amended Complaint abandoned the 
theory of dedication by the Plat, and dedication 
by the Plat was not pled as grounds for relief. 
Respondents presented no evidence or argument on 
such issue. The "dedication" of Common Beach 
found by District Judge Verby was outside the 
scope of the Respondents' grounds for relief. 
XII. Respondents did not meet the requirements of Idaho 
Code § 5-203 or § 5-205 because they were never 
seized or possessed of the real estate within 5 or 
20 years as required by law, nor did they bring 
this action within the time period. 
XIII.The District Judge erred in not finding that 
DORSEY has the benefit of Idaho Code § 5-206, as 
the owner of legal title to Lot 1, they are 
presumed to be the possessor and the Respondents 
never held or adversely possessed the property at 
issue. The District Court erred in shifting the 
burden of poof, on the issue of adverse possession 
onto DORSEYS instead of the Respondents. 
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XIV. The District Court erred in finding the 
Respondents have a use easement appurtenant to all 
8 lots. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
DORSEY claims attorney fees and costs on appeal. The 
basis of the claim is Idaho Code § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 
54(e) (1) and I.A.R. 41. Based upon the facts and law the 
action is brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR QUIET TITLE 
Ross, Brown, and Murphy filed an Amended Complaint For 
Quiet Title (R. Vol. 2, pp 192-206). The Amended Complaint 
was very much like the Complaint, except it did not allege 
that the face of the Plat itself reflected a beach area (20 
feet X 132.87 feet) located between the ordinary mean high 
waters of Priest Lake and the west boundary of Lot 1 
"intentionally left unplatted" by Harker. The quiet title, 
claim for relief, was based on the fact that on February 21, 
1966, Harkers, by Warranty Deed (Exhibit B to Amended 
Complaint), conveyed Lot 1 to WRIGHT, and in the Warranty 
Deed, Harker to Wright, was the language, 
"It is specifically understood that the grantors 
reserve, as a common beach for all owners in said 
plat, that certain tract and beach lying between 
the mean high water line and the West boundary 
line of said Lot One. Said reserved beach being a 
tract approximately 20 feet wide between the 
waters of Priest Lake and the West boundary of the 
above described Lot One, and 132.87 feet in 
length." 
(R. Vol. 1, p. 13, para. VII) 
Ross, Brown, and Murphy allege that the common beach 
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front area (20' X 132.87') is currently held in title by 
HARKER, based on Harker's reservation language, who are 
believed deceased. (R. Vol. 1, P 14, para X) 
II. THE AMENDED ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM, AND CROSS-CLAIM 
DORSEY contested the Amended Complaint by pointing out, 
a) The Plat did not depict any so-called "common 
beach area" dedication of land between the west boundary of 
Lot 1 and the waters of Priest Lake because the Plat itself 
contained HARKER'S statement in the OWNER'S CERTIFICATION on 
the face of the Plat that, 
"It is the intent of the Owners that Lot 1 and the 
20 foot private road as shown on the herein plat 
shall include the lands lying between the side 
lines produced to the mean-high-water-line of 
Priest Lake." 
In other words, Harker did not create a common beach 
area because HARKER expressly stated that Lot 1 included 
land extended to Priest Lake and the Plat depicted it as 
extending to Priest Lake. 
b) The original language in the HARKER to Wright 
Warranty Deed, as a reservation in HARKER, as a matter of 
law did not create any right, title, or interest in favor of 
third parties, i.e., ROSS, BROWN, AND MURPHY or their 
predecessors. 
c) Ross, Brown, and Murphy have no basis for quiet 
title because they must rely on the strength of their own 
title, 
1. have never been conveyed any interest in the 
real estate, and the reservation by Harker 
created no rights in them, and 
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2. no dedication ever created any right to a 
"buffer strip", and if it did, it was later 
reserved by and remained vested in Harker. 
3. the Plat itself expressly platted the real 
estate at issue as part of Lot 1, and not as 
a common beach area. 
(R., Vol. 1, p. 28, 29) 
d) F.M. HARKER died and all his real estate interest 
passed to his surviving spouse, Gladys L. Harker by Probate 
Decree, Bonner County Case No. 10918, recorded 1-20-1972, 
Instrument No. 138845. (R., Vol. 1, p. 31, para 20) 
e) NITELLA WRIGHT executed a Warranty Deed (Exhibit C 
to Complaint) to DORSEY for real estate described as Lots 1 
and 2 in Steamboat Bay Lots, according to the plat thereof 
(emphasis added). (R., Vol. 1, p. 31, para 22) 
III. PLAINTIFF'S (SIC) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Ross, Brown, and Murphy filed a Plaintiff's (sic) 
Motion for Summary Judgment, 2-17-2010, (R., Vol. 1, p. 46) 
which was based only on the pleadings and an Affidavit by a 
surveyor, Bailey. Bailey did a Location Survey, which 
relied on the original Steamboat Bay Lots, which he attached 
as Exhibit A to his Affidavit. (R., Vol. 1, p. 48-49) 
Surveyor Bailey agreed with DORSEY that Lot 1 was platted as 
including all land extended to Priest Lake! 
IV. DORSEY'S OBJECTION AND MEMORANDUM OPPOSING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUPPORTING AFFIDAVITS 
DORSEY filed an OBJECTION (R. Vol. 1, p. 66) and 
supported it with a Memorandum (R. Vol. 1, p. 83-101) 19 
pages in length with citations to legal principals and also 
supported by Affidavit of Nitella Wright (R. Vol. 1, p. 102-
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106). Nitel1a Wright's affidavit was clear and 
uncontroverted that Wright bought and owned all of Lot 1 
including the land extended to the waters of Priest Lake and 
that she conveyed it all to DORSEY by Warranty Deed for Lots 
1 and 2, Steamboat Bay Lots, according the plat as recorded. 
DORSEY did not file a summary judgment motion. 
V. ORDER (April 28, 2010) DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, BUT PARTIALLY GRANTING A SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AGAINST DORSEY 
District Court Charles W. Hosack heard the matters on 
Plaintiff's summary judgment motion on March 17, 2010, and 
the record contains a transcript thereof, mistakenly 
referring to District Judge Steve Verby as presiding. At 
argument, counsel for DORSEY pointed out the Plat 
specifically included the land at issue as being platted as 
part of Lot 1 and that Idaho law was that the reservation in 
the Warranty Deed from Harker to Wright created no rights in 
third parties and is void for creating rights such as the 
Plaintiffs. (R., Vol. 1, p. 25-26). Ross, Brown, and 
Murphy, in quiet title must rely on the strength of their 
own title, not an asserted weakness of DORSEY'S title. To 
which arguments, the District Judge responded that no one 
would ever put a reservation in a deed because it's "just 
null and void" and "that just doesn't make any sense." (R., 
Vol. 1, p. 25, 11. 18-25). 
District Judge Hosack ended the hearing by denying the 
Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Motion, but directing an order 
granting partial summary judgment to Ross, Brown, and 
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Murphy, against DORSEY, that Dorsey's hold no fee simple 
title interest in the beach front property as such title was 
specifically reserved from the initial conveyance of Lot 1 
from Harker to Dorsey's predecessor, Wright (R., Vol. 1, p. 
137). In other words, the Order, contrary to quiet title 
law was based solely on the weakness of DORSEY'S title. 
DORSEY points out that the actual Plaintiff's Motion 
For Summary Judgment, filed 2-17-2010, generically moves for 
"summary judgment" with no particularity or specificity, but 
their Memorandum in support ends with the IV. Conclusion 
that the Court should find and conclude that Plaintiff's 
together with Defendants, are co-tenants and co-owners of 
the real property lying between the mean high water mark of 
Priest Lake and the west boundary of Lot 1 of Steamboat Bay 
Plat. The Court should further find that the clear and 
unambiguous language in the Harker to Wright deed creates 
such a common ownership. (R., Vol. I, p. 62) 
District Judge Hosack turned this around on DORSEY in 
his Order, to say DORSEY held no fee simple title interest 
in the property, which was never even sought in the motion. 
DORSEY filed a detailed Motion to Set Aside, Alter, 
Amend and Reconsider Court's Order filed April 28, 2010. 
(R., Vol. I, p. 139-144). The Order was only interlocutory. 
The action was for "quiet title" to the beach front area, 
for which no basis was presented as to their acquisition or 
conveyance of title, except the reservation language in the 
Harker to Wright Warranty Deed. They had the burden to 
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prove the strength of their own title to the property at 
issue, not the weakness of their adversary. 
Since the "reservation" was void for all purposes, 
Harker conveyed all of Lot 1 to Wright, and Wright 
subsequently conveyed all of Lot 1 to DORSEY. 
The Order, should be reversed. 
VI . THE LANGUAGE "SUBJECT TO" IN THE WARRANTY DEED, WRIGHT 
TO DORSEY DOES NOT CREATE AN EASEMENT 
The 1999 Warranty Deed from Wright to Dorsey, 
Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 2 (and Exhibit "c" to Amended 
Complaint, R. Vol. 2, p. 203) limits the grantor's 
warranties but does not withhold, reserve, or except 
anything from the title conveyed. The conveyance is of 
"Lots 1 and 2, in Steamboat Bay Lots, according to the Plat 
thereof ... " The Plat, Owner's Certification, created Lot 1 to 
extend all the way to Priest Lake. The Plat did not create 
or leave any unplatted strip of land, or buffer of land, 
between Lot 1 and the water line (original ordinary high 
water mark) of Priest Lake. 
The words in the Warranty Deed, Wright to Dorsey of 
"Subject To" item no. 5, Instrument No. 200169, recorded May 
18, 1978 (which is the Harker to Wright deed, R. Vol. 2, p. 
202) do not create any easement or property right, nor does 
it "withhold, reserve, or except" anything from the title 
conveyed. Idaho case law is explicit on this point, as 
stated and explained in Capstar Radio qperating Co. v. 
Lawrence, 143 Idaho 704, at 707, 152 P.3d 581 (2007), as 
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follows: 
1. "An easement is the right to use the land of 
another for a specific purpose that is not 
inconsistent with the general use of the property 
by the owners. Akers v. D.L. White Const., Inc. 
142 Idaho 293, 301, 127 P.3d 196, 204 (2005). An 
express easement, being an interest in real 
property, may only be created by a written 
instrument. Shultz v. Atkins, 97 Idaho 770, 773, 
554 P.2d 948, 951 (1976) (citing I.C. § 9-503; 
McReynolds v. Harrig£eld, 26 Idaho 26, 140 P. 1096 
(1914». "No particular forms or words of art are 
necessary [to create an express easement]; it is 
necessary only that the parties make clear their 
intention to establish a servitude." Benninger v. 
Deri£ield, 142 Idaho 486, 489, 129 P.3d 1235, 1238 
(2006) (quoting Seccombe v. Weeks, 115 Idaho 433, 
436, 767 P.2d 276, 279 (Ct.App.1989)." 
2. "In determining that the sale agreement 
created an express easement the court focused upon 
the following language in paragraph 5: "Subject to 
and including an ingress egress easement over this 
and adjoining property in said sections 21 and 22 
owned by the grantor ... " The question is whether 
the parties made clear their intention to 
establish a servitude over the Section 21 parcel 
subsequently acquired by the Lawrences for the 
benefit of other unspecified property owned by the 
Funks in Sections 21 and 22. There is nothing in 
the sale agreement that indicates an immediate 
grant of easement rights. Indeed, the Funks could 
not then have granted themselves an easement over 
the property being sold to Human Synergistics 
since they were the record owners of fee title at 
the time." 
Caps tar, supra, 
143 Idaho 704 at 708 
In Capstar, supra, the Warranty Deed words "subject 
to:" did not create any easement (servitude), "as it ... merely 
warrants the property is "free from all encumbrances". (143 
Idaho 704 at 709) The "subject to" language would exclude 
the warranties of title concerning the subject to paragraph 
5. 
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The foregoing is precisely like the instant Warranty 
Deed Harker to Wright, the "subject to" para 5, would merely 
exclude warranties of title as to that document/instrument. 
The Caps tar, supra, case is the authority to overrule 
District Judge Hosack's Order (on the Plaintiff's Motion For 
Summary Judgment) to the effect that the "subject to" 
language of the Warranty Deed Wright to Dorsey withheld part 
of DORSEY'S Lot 1. District Judge Verby, without any 
findings or conclusions held that he came to the same 
conclusion that Judge Hosack did. (Tr. Vol., p. 319, 11. 
18-22). Both District Judges should be reversed as to the 
order (on summary judgment) . 
VII. THE TRIAL AND ORAL ARGUMENTS AT TRIAL COMPLETION 
The arguments of both counsel to the District Judge at 
the end of the trial set forth the factual and legal 
theories advanced below. The argument by both Counsel are 
reporter's transcript (Tr.) entitled Tr., Vol. 1, June 27 & 
28, 2011 at page 276 through 310. The District Court took 
the matter under advisement, and reconvened June 30, 2011 
giving his findings, conclusions, and decision orally on the 
record transcribed as part of Tr., Vol. 1, at Tr. Vol. 1, pp 
313-329. 
A. THE CASE PRESENTED BY ROSS, BROWN, AND MURPHY BY 
THEIR COUNSEL, SUPPORTING THEIR OWN ACTION, AT 
CLOSING ARGUMENT. 
1. They agreed with DORSEY'S asserted proposition of 
law that Plaintiffs cannot rest on the weakness of 
defendant's claim of title, but rather have to put 
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forth the strength of their own title. 
1, p. 276, 1. 21 through p. 277, 1. 1) 
(Tr., Vol. 
2. Their position for quiet title is the first deed 
of record on these platted lots. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 
277, 11. 3-5) 
3. The first deed of record was from Harker to Wright 
for Lot 1, which they asserted excluded the beach 
front. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 279, 11. 1-6) 
4. Their position is that fee title was reserved by 
Harker from the Wright transaction. (Tr. Vol. 1, 
p. 279, 11. 14-18) 
5. The chain of title that supports their position is 
the express reservation of title (emphasis added) 
by Harkers, at the time when they owned it to 
reserve it to themselves, excepting it from Lot 
l's conveyance. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 280, 11. 22-25, p. 
281, 1. 1) 
6. The intent of Harkers that this is a common beach 
front is shown in later deeds of lots 3 through 8 
to Battaglia and Moore by the description of the 
lots being subject to any claims to the difference 
in the mean high water line of Priest Lake and the 
meander line shown by government survey. (Tr. Vol. 
1, p. 281, 11. 5-10) 
7. They are not trying to take away the beach 
ownership from Dorsey, they are simply trying to 
get the Court to declare that is a shared 
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ownership four ways, among all four owners, 
amongst all eight lots. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 282, 11. 
2-5) 
8. So strictly speaking the issue is pretty simple, 
Harkers reserved it and reserved it as co-owned by 
all eight lots. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 288, 11. 17) 
9. The only question was whether the defendants 
(Dorsey) have succeeding of depriving plaintiffs 
of ownership by their adverse possession claim. 
(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 288, 11. 19-25) 
10. That's all I have. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 288, 1. 25) 
(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 289, 1. 1) 
B. THE CASE PRESENTED BY DORSEY BY THEIR COUNSEL AT 
CLOSING ARGUMENT. 
1. The argument commenced by analyzing the testimony 
of plaintiff's witnesses, but was interrupted by a 
question from the District Judge directing counsel 
to hold on just a minute. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 289 to 
291 at 1. 7) 
2. The District Judge said that all along DORSEY's 
counsel has contended it takes a conveyance 
pursuant to 9-503 (Idaho Code) in order to obtain 
ownership. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 291, 11. 8-11) 
3. The District Judge said the only thing I see that 
grants any interest, (emphasis added) is that the 
owner's certification on the plat that is filed 
which says "it is the intent of the owners that 
Lot 1 and the 20 foot private road as shown on the 
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herein plat shall include the lands and lands 
lying between the sidelines produced to the mean 
high water line of Priest Lake, the use of the 20 
feet private road as shown on the herein plat is 
hereby dedicated to the adjacent lot owners. That 
creates an easement. It does not create a grant 
or a conveyance." (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 291, 11. 15-24) 
4. DORSEY'S counsel described Lot 1 as stated by the 
Owner's Certification that the north line extended 
or protruded to Priest Lake. The south line also 
extends out to the water line. The water line is 
a place wherever it was as the ordinary high water 
mark found on the land in 1890. Title above that 
point was owned by the adjoining owner, below is 
owned by the State. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 293, 11. 15-
22) (This is the Equal Footing Doctrine) 
5. What did the deed Harker to Wright reserve? Take 
it right from the deed, the deed is not ambiguous, 
its unequivocal. It states that grantors reserve 
a tract and beach lying between the high water 
line and the west boundary of Lot 1. (Tr., Vol. 1, 
p. 294, 11. 1-6) 
6. Harker having done the plat and making of their 
certification on the plat extending the lot to the 
water, there is no tract of land because the lot 
and the lake have to touch. The west boundary of 
Lot 1 is platted to adjoin the Lake so in effect 
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Harker reserved a description, a statement of 
something non-existence. So our first statement 
is the deed did not reserve anything to them. 
(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 294, 11. 7-13) 
7. If they reserve something, the law is pretty 
clear, something you reserve yourself stays with 
yourself. No one else has the benefit of it. 
(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 291, 11. 20-23) 
8. Citation of law to the Court of Davis v. Gowen, 83 
Idaho 204 (360 P.2d 403 (1961). A conveyance 
where the owner reserved in common with other 
owners was void for all purposes as far as 
creating an interest in those other owners. 
Vol. 1, p. 295, 11. 9-18) 
(Tr. , 
9. According to the plat, the reserved area is part 
of Lot 1. It is Lot l's beach. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 
297, 11. 1-2) 
10. Ross, Brown, and Murphy are judicially bound, as 
the first person plaintiffs sue is Harker, and 
claimed they did not get title because (emphasis 
added) it stayed in Harker because Harker reserved 
it. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 300, 11. 21-25) 
11. They sued Harker. That could be fatal to their 
case, they haven't showed us they served them, 
they haven't tried that case. The only other 
Defendant is DORSEY. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 301, 11. 1-
5) (Actually DORSEY'S lienholder banks are parties 
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too, which is irrelevant to this appeal.) 
12. That's the end of the argument. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 
302, 1. 7) 
C. ROSS, BROWN, AND MURPHY - REBUTTAL ARGUMENT BY 
THEIR COUNSEL. 
The rebuttal argument was very inconsistent. 
a) Harkers held back some land reserving fee 
ownership, that is what the language expressed. 
(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 305) 
b) The intent of Harkers is fairly well 
expressed in the deed to Wright (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 
307) 
c) Harkers conveyed one-eighth in that beach to 
Wright, and reserved seven-eighths interest. (Tr., 
Vol. 1, p. 307) 
d) In a way, its most simply distilled, that 
Harker did convey Lot 1 in a way and in a manner 
that DORSEY would like the Court to interpret, the 
lines produced to the high water mark of the lake, 
but they reserved seven-eighths for that area for 
the remaining seven lots passed to Battaglia, then 
passed to my clients. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 306) 
In this argument Ross, Brown, and Murphy's own 
counsel admitted and agreed with DORSEY that Lot 1 
extended to Priest Lake! Their only remaining 
theory for quiet title was the "reservation" in 
Harker. 
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D. DORSEY'S FINAL ARGUMENT AND CLOSING. 
a) Its clear that what he (Harker) purported to 
keep was a piece of land that did not lie in Lot 
1, so there is not a reservation of anything. 
(Tr. Vol .. 1, p. 209, 11. 1-2) 
The Plat extended Lot 1 to Priest Lake, so the 
"reserved" land lying between Lot 1 and the Lake is non-
existent. 
b) When Frances Harker died in 1972, his wife, 
Gladys, obtained a Decree Settling Final Account 
and Final Distribution of Estate, filed January 
20, 1972. This Decree is trial exhibit 
Defendants' Exhibit D (4 pages). The Decree 
(second page) says that Harker has a Vendor's 
interest "***in and to Lot 1 in Steamboat Bay 
Lots, according to the plat thereof recorded in 
Book 2 of Plats, Page 125 ... which is being sold on 
contract to R.G. Wright and Nitella Wright, 
husband and wife". Harker's own estate decree 
says they sold Lot 1 according to the Plat, and 
does not claim it was "reserving" anything. This 
ought to be conclusive of what Harker intended. 
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 309, 11. 7-22) 
c) Ahead of the Estate, real close to when they 
sold to Wrights, both F.M. Harker and Gladys 
Harker on October 11, 1967 recorded a Quit Claim 
Deed to the Old National Bank of Washington, given 
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for security purposes only pursuant to assignment 
of real estate contract by Harker to Old National 
Bank, which is DORSEY'S trial exhibit DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT II. This Quit Claim Deed describes Lot 
One (1) in Steamboat Bay Lots, according to the 
plat thereof.... This has to refer to the escrowed 
real estate contract (1966) Harker to Wright. So, 
in the only two documents by Harker after sale of 
Lot 1 to Wright, best suited to know if they kept 
(reserved) any of the Lot 1, they platted as 
extending to Priest Lake, they did not even 
purport to claim any "reservation" ownership 
interest in said Lot 1. This occurred 40 years 
ago and it still means something. 
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 309, 11. 22-25) 
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 310, 11. 1-15) 
d) There is no dedication on the plat of a 
common beach for common users, owners. It is part 
of Lot 1. It is clear, there is no ambiguity to 
try to figure out. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 308. 11. 21-
25) 
e) Attorney Featherston argued and agreed there 
is a statute of limitations when you are suing for 
real estate, within 5 years now possibly 20 years. 
The matters sued on existed for over 30 years. 
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 310, 11. 16-25) 
(Idaho Code § 5-203 provides that no action for 
recovery or possession can be maintained unless 
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Plaintiff of his predecessor was possessed of the 
property within 20 years, which statute formerly 
had a 5 year period.) 
f) As to the road (private road) the use of 
which was dedicated on the Plat to all adjoining 
lot owners whether it created fee simple or only 
use of the road, it is an easement (if the Court 
says it is). It is not a disputed issue, not in 
the suit (action) or the Counterclaim. 
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 311, 11. 15-22) 
The foregoing ended the arguments after trial. 
E. DISTRICT JUDGE VERBY'S ORAL DECISION, JUNE 30, 
2011. 
The findings, conclusions, and direction for entry of 
judgment were made orally on the record, and were reported 
at Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 313-329. DORSEY contends District Judge 
Verby was substantially in error in the following regards in 
his findings and conclusions. 
District Judge Verby's Findings/Conclusions: 
1. The first survey on February 17, 1966 upon close 
examination it shows that Lot 1 is not contiguous with the 
waters of Priest Lake, it shows what I characterize as a 
buffer of land between the Lake and Lot 1. 
DORSEY'S response is that the District Judge is in 
error, in that what he called the first survey, which is the 
Plat of Steamboat Bay Lots itself, which in the Owner's 
Certification, signed by Harker, Harker clearly and 
unambiguously states that Lot 1 shall include (emphasis 
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added) the lands lying between the sidelines produced to the 
water line of Priest Lake. 
(Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 315,11. 9-14) 
2. All three surveys reflect and show that the west 
side of Lot 1 does not intersect with the waters of Priest 
Lake. 
(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 315, 11. 14-17) 
DORSEY'S response is that the District Judge's 
statement is contrary to the testimony of the plaintiff's 
own surveyor, Gilbert Bailey, the only surveyor that 
testified. Bailey testified all three (3) surveys were 
substantially the same. The Steamboat Bay Plat (survey 1) 
had no significant discrepancy with his survey (survey 3) 
except for a 2 inch iron pipe instead of a seven-eighths 
drill steel at the northeast corner of Lot 1. (Tr., Vol. 1, 
p. 56, 11. 22-25); p. 57, 11. 1-5) 
Surveyor Bailey also testified his survey just 
confirmed Mr. Young's survey in 1998 (survey 2) and the plat 
in 1966. 
(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 58, 11. 22-25) 
Bailey also testified in response to a question as 
follows: 
"Q. In retracing Lot 1 according to the plat 
of Steamboat Bay Lots, do you find the north 
line of government - excuse me, the north 
line of Lot 1 of the plat extends to the 
ordinary high water line of Priest Lake?" 
"A. In my professional opinion in 
conjunction with the ownership certificate on 
the original plat, the line would extend 
through that northerly point on line monument 
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to the original high water, wherever that may 
be." 
Further, 
"Q. And would that be the same on the south 
line of Lot 1?" 
"A. It would be." 
(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 61,11.21-23) 
Bailey also gave deposition testimony, which is trial 
Defendant's EXHIBIT KK (12 pages). The plat and the 2 
subsequent surveys are Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 to his 
deposition. When asked where the northwest corner of lot 1 
is located, according to the plat Bailey testified: 
"A. According to the plat it would be on an 
extension of the northerly line through the 
monument to the high water." 
(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 14, 1. 25 through p. 15, 1. 2) 
Bailey further marked the location of the "NW" 
monument, and also marked the north line of Lot 1 
intersected Priest Lake as a circle on his survey attached 
to his deposition, and labeled it "Approx HW" (high water) 
and testified: 
"A. Well, it would be the intersection of 
the north line of the lot extended through 
this point ("N/W" monument) through this 
point to the mean high water of Priest Lake." 
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 15, 11. 13-15) 
Bailey testified that high water or mean high water is 
often defined as where vegetation stops. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 
16, 11. 17-25). For clarification, Dorsey submits the 
actual legal wording for this same mark is the "ordinary 
high water" mark or line, on the Equal Footing Doctrine, 
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when Idaho was admitted to the Union in 1890. 
In summary, the Plat, the Surveys, and the surveyor's 
testimony all agree that lot 1 extends to and abuts Priest 
Lake. Bailey agreed with DORSEY. 
3. District Judge Verby quoted the first 2 sentences 
from the Plat, Owner's Certification into the record at Tr. 
Vol. 1, p. 316, 11. 2-8; as 2 successive sentences. 
The Owner's Certification is actually, as follows: 
Owner's Certification 
"KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS that F .M. HARKER 
and GLADYS L. HARKER, his wife, certify that they 
are the owners of the land embraced by the herein 
plat of STEAMBOAT BAY LOTS in Gov't Lot 4, Section 
27, T60N, R4W, B.M., Bonner Co., Idaho and had the 
same platted into lots as shown on the herein 
plat, the boundaries of which are more 
specifically described as follows: [legal 
description] 
It is the intent of the Owners that lot 1 and 
the 20-foot private road as shown on the herein 
plat shall include the lands lying between the 
side lines produced to the mean-high-water-line of 
Priest Lake. 
The use of the 20-foot Private Road as shown on 
the herein plat is hereby dedicated to the 
adjacent lot owners. Access to public road cannot 
be guaranteed." 
The first sentence only states that lot 1 and the 
private road shall extend to Priest Lake. There is no 
referenced to "dedicated" or "use". The next paragraph 
states "***The ~ (emphasis added) of the 20 foot Private 
Road as shown on the herein plat is hereby dedicated to the 
adjacent lot owners. 
In other words, only the road is dedicated to use of 
the adjacent lot owners. 
4. The District Judge agreed with DORSEY that, 
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"Nothing was ever conveyed from Harker to any 
other lot owner because those lot owners -
other lot owners didn't exist." 
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 322, 11. 7-8) 
He went on to find that the Plaintiffs did not receive 
anything, they received nothing, certainly didn't receive a 
fee simple interest in the area that was reserved. (Tr. Vol. 
1, p. 322, 11. 11-16) 
F. THE ONLY GROUNDS FOR THE RELIEF GIVEN BY THE 
DISTRICT JUDGE WAS THE LANGUAGE ON THE PLAT 
ITSELF. DORSEY'S ARGUMENT AS TO THE IDAHO CASE 
LAW RELIED UPON BY THE DISTRICT JUDGE. 
District Judge Verby's finding was the "intention" of 
Harker in regard to the Plat, as to what he characterized as 
a "buffer of land" between Lot 1 and Priest Lake, and the 
effects of such language used on the recorded Plat 
certification. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 315, 11. 19-23) 
District Judge Verby then read the language of the 
Plat, Harker's OWNER'S CERTIFICATION, into the record as two 
(2) separate paragraphs. However, DORSEY points out that 
these 2 sentences are actually 2 separate paragraphs. The 
first sentence paragraph states that Lot 1 and the 20 foot 
private road include the lands between the sidelines 
produced the mean high water line of Priest Lake. This 
sentence does not just refer to Lot 1 sidelines as extended 
to Priest Lake, but rather it says "Lot 1 and the 20 feet 
private road" shall (both) extend to Priest Lake. 
The second sentence paragraph does not at all refer to 
Lot 1, and it shows Harker is only referring to the private 
road, wherein it states that "The use (emphasis added) of 
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the 20 foot private road is dedicated (emphasis added) to 
the adjacent lot owners. The word "use" and the word 
"dedicated" refer only and specifically to the 20 foot 
private road. Harker did not use the words use or dedicated 
in reference to Lot 1 or any portion of Lot 1, but used them 
only in reference to the 20 foot Private Road. 
District Judge Verby then stated, 
"The language on the plat I find to be 
ambiguous as a matter of law." 
(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 317,11.8-9) 
He cited (as Bonner v. Lefee (sic» which is Bondy v. 
Levy, 121 Idaho 993 (1992) for the proposition that because 
the language is reasonably subject to conflicting 
interpretation, he finds it ambiguous. Judge Yerby's 
foregoing statement is a conclusion, without any stated 
reference to fact, language, or finding. He does not state 
what words, sentence, or language are reasonably subject to 
conflicting interpretation. What is one reasonable 
interpretation? What are the different reasonable 
interpretations? DORSEY submits the conflicting reasonable 
interpretations are unknown and were definitely not stated 
by District Judge Verby. 
DORSEY further submits that the Owner's Certification 
is clear and unambiguous as stated by Harker that, 
a) The first sentence/paragraph clearly states for 
Lot 1 and 20 foot private road that the sidelines of both 
extend to Priest Lake. There is nothing about use or 
dedication mentioned. 
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b) The second sentence/paragraph clearly states that 
use of the 20 foot private road is dedicated to all 
adjoining lot owners. 
The question of whether a contract is ambiguous or not 
is a question of law over which the Supreme Court may 
exercise free review, except where neither party argued an 
ambiguity, the Supreme Court in exercise of free review 
applies the plain meaning of words used. 
Bondy v. Levy, 121 Idaho 993 
829 P.2d 1342 (1992) 
Mortensen v. Stewart Title 
149 Idaho 437 at 442, 235 P.3d 387 (2010) 
So, on this appeal the Supreme Court may exercise free 
review as to whether the 2 separate sentence/paragraphs on 
the Owner's Certification by Harker are ambiguous or not. 
DORSEY submits the Owner's Certification is clear and 
unambiguous. Cited in the foregoing Bondy case, supra, is 
Galaxy Outdoor Advertising v. Idaho Transportation 
Department, 109 Idaho 692, 710 P.2d 602 (1985) where the 
terms of a con tract are unambiguous, as they are,... "courts 
can not revise the contract in order to make a better 
agreement for the parties." (Galaxy, 109 Idaho 692 at 695) 
The Galaxy case, supra, cites to McCallum v. Campbell-
Simpson Motor Co, 82 Idaho 160, 349 P.2d 986 
(1960) .McCallum, supra, sets forth the following rules, 
"While a court may interpret agreements 
voluntarily entered into, a court cannot 
modify an agreement so as to create a new and 
different one, nor is a court at liberty to 
revise an agreement where its interpretation 
is involved. Courts cannot make for the 
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parties better agreements than they 
themselves have been satisfied to make, and 
by a process of interpretation relieve one of 
the parties from the terms which he 
voluntarily consented to; nor can courts 
interpret an agreement to mean something the 
contract does not itself contain." 
(Citation to Am. Jur. and Case law) 
McCallum v. Campbell-S~son Motor Co 
82 Idaho 160 at 166 
G. DISTRICT JUDGE ERRED THAT THE PLAT ITSELF 
DEDICATED AN EASEMENT FOR ALL 8 LOT OWNERS TO A 
BUFFER OF LAND 
District Judge Verby decided that the Owner's 
Certification on the Plat only stated that the "***use was 
dedicated." (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 323, 11. 10-14) DORSEY agrees 
that the use of the 20 foot private road was dedicated to 
all adjoining lot owners, lots 1-8; however the Plat Owner's 
Certification wording extended Lot 1 to Priest Lake did not 
dedicate its use at all. District Judge Verby had concluded 
the Owner's Certification to be ambiguous ~ ~ matter of law 
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 317, 11. 8-9), so he proceeded to find the 
"intent" of Harker by using the language of the owner's 
certification. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 319, 11. 12-17) His 
conclusion was, 
"Now, as to the language in the plat, the 
owner's certification, I do find that it was 
the intention of the grantors, that is the 
Harkers, to create a common private road and 
private beach for the benefit of all of the 
owners of the subdivision." 
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 320, 11. 15-19) 
This is reversible error. Once the District Judge 
found the Plat Owner's Certification language was ambiguous 
as a matter of law, it is legally incorrect to find that 
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ambiguous language could be a common law dedication because 
a common law dedication must be clear and unequivocal, not 
"ambiguous". The recent case of Asbury Park v. Greenbriar 
Estates, 152 Idaho 338, 271 P.3d 1194 (2012), decided after 
the instant action, has the identical legal issue as the 
instant action. In Asbury Park, supra, the plat language 
designated Lot 39 as a common area to be owned by the lot 
homeowner's association. The CC & R's stated Lot 39 is the 
intended location of a community storage facility. On the 
appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court found the same result as the 
district court that lot 39 had not been common dedicated to 
the homeowners by the plat and CC'& R's because those 
documents were inconsistent and therefore contained 
ambiguity. Asbury Park, supra, held, 
" ... As we reasoned in West Wood Investments, 
Inc., one cannot show a clear and unequivocal 
intent to dedicate where the alleged offeror 
demonstrates intent inconsistent with a 
dedication. 141 Idaho at 87, 106 P.3d at 
413. In West Wood, the recorded plat and a 
recorded security interest contained 
inconsistent statements regarding ownership 
of the real property at issue, and as a 
consequence we concluded that "[t]he 
surrounding circumstances of the transaction 
reveal nothing more ... than an ambiguous 
intent." Id. Since "unequivocal" and 
"ambiguous" are antonyms, no reasonable 
person could conclude that the conflicting 
(and therefore ambiguous) statements 
reflected in these contradictory documents 
reflected Asbury Park's unequivocal intent. 
See Mo~yneux v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 54 
Idaho 619, 632, 35 P.2d 651, 656 (1934) 
(noting that the dictionary definition of 
"unequivocal" included the meaning "Not 
ambiguous"). Here, any reasonable reading of 
the recorded plat and CC & Rs can only lead 
to a finding that the two documents contain 
inconsistent statements as to the intended 
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ownership of Lot 39 . ... If 
Asbury Park v. Greenbriar Estates, 
152 Idaho 338 at page 8 
In summary, District Judge Verby found the Plat with 
Owner's Certification, to be ambiguous as a matter of law, 
but he found from the language of the Owner's Certification 
that it was Harker's intent was to dedicate the use of the 
"buffer of land" to all 8 lot owners. The legal and 
dictionary definition of the common law dedication 
requirement of "clear and unequivocal" includes the meaning 
"not ambiguous". 
District Judge Verby found the plat language as 
ambiguous, i.e. reasonably subject to conflicting 
interpretation. As a matter of law a common law dedication 
requires clear and unequivocal intent to dedicate. Clear 
and unequivocal intent from the Owner's Certification by 
Harker cannot be ambiguous. 
District Judge Verby recognized the lack of a clear and 
unequivocal dedication he said "so inartfully the Harkers 
try to make their intentions known in the owner's 
certification." 
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 318, 11. 11-13) 
VIII.THE DISTRICT JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE GRANTED AN EASEMENT 
BECAUSE IT WAS NEVER PLED OR ARGUED. 
A claim for relief must be pled in the Amended 
Complaint. Mortensen v. Stewart Tit~e Guarantee, 149 Idaho 
437, 443-444, 253 P.3d 387, 393-394 (2010). Mortensen, 
supra, explains that, 
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[16,17]"*** This Court has already expressly 
rejected the notion that an unpleaded claim 
can be preserved for appeal merely because 
the district court addressed the claim's 
merits. Pleading is necessary to put the 
opposing party on notice of the claims it is 
facing and thereby "insure that a just result 
is accomplished." Seiniger Law Office, 145 
Idaho at 246-47, 178 P.3d at 611-12. An 
unpleaded cause of action simply cannot be 
considered, whether on summary judgment or on 
appeal. Estes v. Bar~, 132 Idaho 82, 86, 967 
P.2d 284, 288 (1998). For example, in Beco 
v. City of Idaho Falls, 124 Idaho 859, 865 
P.2d 950 (1993), this Court refused to 
consider the appellant's unpleaded breach-of-
contract claim despite the fact that the 
district court ruled on the claim's merits. 
Id. At 865, 865 P.2d at 956. 
Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co. 
149 Idaho 437 at 444 
Ross, Brown, and Murphy pled for the relief of co-
owning or being co-tenants of the beach front/buffer strip 
of land. They never sought the relief of having an 
"easement", which is defined as the right to use the land of 
another. At the final arguments they never argued for an 
easement. Neither counsel argued "easement" as grounds for 
relief to Ross, Brown, and Murphy. District Judge Verby, 
evidently on his own theory saw the word "use" in the 
Owner's Certification which dedicated the use of the 20 foot 
private road to adjoining lot owners. He then inserted 
"use" as meaning "easement" and applied "use" to the Owner's 
Certification preceding sentence/paragraph, which does not 
even mention "use" or "dedication". He found the use of the 
buffer of land was an "easement". He granted relief solely 
as an "easement". 
I.R.C.P. 8(a) (1) the general rules of pleading requires 
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pleading the claim showing entitlement to relief. Relief 
may be alternate or of several types. However, Ross, Brown, 
and Murphy never pled, claimed, or argued as alternate 
relief, the right of use, i.e. an easement. District Judge 
Verby should be reversed on granting an easement to Ross, 
Brown, and Murphy. 
The dedicated use of the 20 foot roadway was never 
pled, never argued, never tried, and never defended against. 
It was not an issue of this action. The Judgment, paragraph 
6, enters a declaratory judgment that the Common Area (also 
has been referred to as buffer of land, beach area, disputed 
land) is a shared perpetual easement appurtenant to and 
benefitting all eight (8) lots of the Plat of steamboat Bay. 
(R. Vol. 2, p. 274, para. 6) 
H. ROSS, BROWN, AND MURPHY CANNOT HAVE A PRIVATE 
DEDICATED EASEMENT IN THE BUFFER OF LAND 
BENEFITTING THEIR PROPERTY. 
This action was all about quiet title to co-
ownership/co-tenancy, of what the District Judge referred to 
as the "buffer of land". Outside the pleadings, trial, and 
theories argued, District Judge Verby found the Plat 
"intention" dedicated~, i.e an appurtenant easement to 
all 8 lots, lot owners, Lots 1-8 (Judgment, para. 7, R. Vol. 
2,p.274). 
Idaho law does not provide for a private dedication of 
an easement. In Coward v. Hadley, 150 Idaho 282, Coward 
sought a private easement for an alley by a deed that served 
the same function as dedicating an alley to public use in a 
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recorded subdivision plat. This claim of Coward is set 
forth in Coward v. Had2ey, 150 Idaho 282 at 288-298, but was 
denied because, 
"There can be no private dedication to a 
restricted class of individuals, such as 
those only owning property abutting an alley. 
The rule that a common-law dedication must be 
for public use has always been a part of 
Idaho jurisprudence. "The essential elements 
of a common law dedication of land are (1) an 
offer by the owner, clearly and unequivocally 
indicated by his words or acts evidencing his 
intention to dedicate the land to a public 
use, and (2) an acceptance of the offer by 
the public." Wor~ey Highway Dist. v. Yacht 
C~ub of Coeur d'A~ene/ Ltd., 116 Idaho 219, 
225, 775 P.2d 111, 117 (1989) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Pullin v. Victor, 103 Idaho 879, 
881, 655 P.2d 86, 88 (Ct.App.1982); see also 
Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 143, 118 
P.2d 740, 743 (1941) (considering whether 
there had been a public dedication to a 
city). It is true that a landowner can 
complete a public dedication by selling lots 
referencing a recorded plat that shows public 
alleys and streets. Sadd2ehorn Ranch 
Landowner's, Inc. v. Dyer, 146 Idaho 747, 
750-51; 203 P.3d 677; 680-81 (2009). The 
dedication, however, is not simply to the 
properties abutting the private way but is 
for public access and administration. Boise 
City v. Hon, 14 Idaho 272, 278, 94 P. 167, 
168 (1908). 
Requiring the dedication to be to the 
public, and not to individuals or to a class 
of private grantees, is a widely accepted 
principle: 
The essence of a dedication is that it 
is for the use of the public at large. 
There may be a dedication for special 
uses, but it must be for the benefit of 
the public. There can be no dedication 
to private uses or for a purpose bearing 
an interest or profit in the land . .. ff 
Further, Coward, supra, at 289, held, 
"Thus, whenever a plat or deed attempts to 
dedicate land to a group that includes less 
than the general public, the dedication 
fails." 
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(Cases cited to Fla. And Kan.) 
According, the Idaho Supreme Court held that Coward 
could have no dedicated easement over Hadley's lot ... "The 
proper way to acquire an easement is to resort to existing 
legal and equitable theories." 
Coward v. Hadley, 150 Idaho 282 at 282 
IX.DORSEY'S ARGUMENT ON ATTORNEY FEES CLAIMED ON APPEAL 
DORSEY requests an award of attorney fees on appeal 
pursuant to Idaho Code §12-121, which states that in any 
, --
civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney fees 
to the prevailing party. I.R.C.P. 54(e) (1) has the 
provision that attorney fees may be awarded only if the 
Court finds the case was brought, pursued, or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. Pursuant 
to I.A.R. 41, DORSEY claims attorney fees on appeal. 
Ross, Brown, and Murphy, at no point, pled or ar~~ed 
any reasonable grounds for relief. They acknowledge the law 
that in quiet title they must prevail, if at all, on the 
strength of their own title. They never offered any 
evidence of title, they had no conveyance of title required 
by Idaho Code § 9-503. 
Ross, Brown, and Murphy never had any possession of the 
real estate at issue or instrument of conveyance. The 
operative plat and Harker to Wright Deed all occurred in 
1966. Idaho Code § 5-203 barred the action they filed over 
30 years later, in 2009. Idaho Code § 5-205 also barred the 
action based on the same time period. Idaho Code §5-207 
-43-
provides that Wright and Dorsey are presumed to have 
adversely held the property. 
In the Amended Complaint, Ross, Brown, and Murphy 
dropped out their original claim that Harker intentionally 
left a common beach area as "unplatted" and dedicated that 
common beach as co-owned by all 8 lot owners. They conceded 
to DORSEY'S claim that Lot 1 was platted by Harker's Owner's 
Certification so as to include all the land extended to 
Priest Lake. The only Amended Complaint grounds for relief 
was that the Harker to Wright, Warranty Deed, reservation 
language, "*** resulted in the reservation and creation of a 
common beach ara (sic - area) for the benefit of all owners 
of Steamboat Bay Lots." (R. Vol. 2, p. 195, para X). 
Correctly so, District Judge Verby ruled that the 
reservation language created no rights in Ross, Brown, and 
Murphy, as a matter of law pursuant to Davis v. Cowen j 83 
Idaho 204. Ross, Brown, and Murphy did not Cross-Appeal. 
They cannot assert errors of the District Court. 
Ross, Brown, and Murphy never pled or argued the 
Owner's Certification was ambiguous, nor did they plead or 
argue as grounds for relief that the Plat created any 
easement in their favor. 
In summary, under no theory, law, request for relief, 
or tried facts could Ross, Brown, and Murphy prevail. 
Ross, Brown, and Murphy alleged that vested title to 
the disputed strip by the reservation language remained in 
Harker. They had no fact, instrument, or law on a basis for 
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relief to obtain it from Harker. They never could "prevail" 
based on their own Amended Complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
DORSEY seeks relief on appeal, as follows: 
1. The Judgment should be reversed and the Amended 
Complaint dismissed as no relief should have been granted to 
Ross, Brown, and Murphy. 
2. Ross, Brown, and Murphy sued in quiet title, 
seeking co-ownership of the real estate at issue, also 
called disputed strip, beach area, or buffer of land, which 
they claimed as a co-owned parcel. They must succeed on the 
strength of their own title, to which they had none, and 
they may not rely on the weakness of DORSEY'S title. Quiet 
title of any sort, ownership or easement, should be denied 
and Judgment entered against them. 
3. The Plat of Ste~~~oat Bay, subseq~ent Surveys, and 
testimony of Mr. Bailey, Ross, Brown, and Murphy's Surveyor, 
created Lot 1 as extending to Priest Lake. There was no 
land between Lot 1 and Priest Lake to "reserve". Lot 1 was 
conveyed Harker to Wright and Wright to Dorsey. Title 
should be quieted in DORSEY. 
4. District Judge Verby found the Owners' 
Certification to be ambiguous as a matter of law. Accepting 
that for argument purposes, an ambiguous Plat could not be a 
clear and unequivocal dedication. The finding of a common 
law dedication should be reversed. 
5. The findings, conclusions, and subsequent Judgment 
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granting recovery to Ross, Brown, and Murphy for use i.e. an 
appurtenant easement to all lots was an unpled, untried, 
unargued surprise result, and should be reversed. 
6. The Judgment granting a private easement to Ross, 
Brown, and Murphy based on a plat dedication is not Idaho 
law, and a private dedication them as adjoining lot owners 
fails. 
7. DORSEY is entitled to recover attorney fees and 
costs, pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121, I.R.C.P. 54(e) (1) 
and I.A.R. 41. 
8. Idaho Code § 5-203 (action to recover realty) the 
Amended Complaint, § 5-205 as a 5 year or 20 year statute of 
limitations bars the Amended Complaint. Idaho Code § 5-207 
provides that DORSEY (and his predecessor Wright) are deemed 
to have held the property adversely, and a decree of title 
entered in DORSEY. 
9. In the Harker/Wright Warranty Deed conveying Lot 
1, "grantors reserve" in themselves a common beach for all 
lot owners. Harkers did own all remaining lots (2-8) at the 
time. By the time of this action, 2009, Harkers owned no 
lots in the Plat. DORSEY seeks the relief of quiet title to 
Lot 1. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12'TIfday of September, 
2012. 
Finney IS6 i3')"6 
ey for Appellants 
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